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Abstract
The Basel II internal ratings-based (IRB) approach to capital adequacy for credit risk plays an important
role in protecting the banking sector against insolvency. We outline the mathematical foundations of
regulatory capital for credit risk, and extend the model specification of the IRB approach to a more
general setting than the usual Gaussian case. It rests on the proposition that quantiles of the distribution
of conditional expectation of portfolio percentage loss may be substituted for quantiles of the portfolio
loss distribution. We present a more compact proof of this proposition under weaker assumptions. Then,
constructing a portfolio that is representative of credit exposures of the Australian banking sector, we
measure the rate of convergence, in terms of number of obligors, of empirical loss distributions to the
asymptotic (infinitely fine-grained) portfolio loss distribution. Moreover, we evaluate the sensitivity
of credit risk capital to dependence structure as modelled by asset correlations and elliptical copulas.
Access to internal bank data collected by the prudential regulator distinguishes our research from other
empirical studies on the IRB approach.
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1. Introduction
Risk capital models serve management functions including capital allocation, performance
attribution, risk pricing, risk identification and monitoring, strategic business planning, and
solvency assessment (i.e., capital adequacy). However, model characteristics best suited for
different purposes may conflict. For example, models for solvency assessment require precision
in the measurement of absolute risk levels under stressed economic conditions, whereas models
for capital allocation need only be accurate in the measurement of relative risk under “normal”
economic conditions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision et al., 2010). While economic
capital models may serve several management functions, the sole purpose of regulatory capital
models is solvency assessment.
Under the Basel II Accord, authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs) are required to assess
capital adequacy for credit, market and operational risks. ADIs determine regulatory capital for
credit risk using either the standardised approach or, subject to approval, the internal rating-
based (IRB) approach. The latter is more expensive to administer, but usually produces lower
regulatory capital requirements than the former. As a consequence, ADIs using the IRB approach
may deploy their capital in pursuit of more (profitable) lending opportunities. The IRB approach
implements the so-called asymptotic single risk factor (ASRF) model, an asset value factor model
of credit risk. This paper examines the model specification of the IRB approach, outlining its
mathematical foundations and evaluating its robustness to a relaxation of model assumptions.
In relation to the latter, we undertake an empirical analysis of the Australian banking sector. Its
findings, though, are pertinent to other banking jurisdictions where regulatory capital charges
are assessed under the IRB approach.
In the context of evaluating model robustness, we briefly comment on the adoption of the
IRB approach by the Australian banking sector. Upon implementation of Basel II in the first
quarter of 2008, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) had granted the four
largest Australian banks, designated “major” banks, approval to use the IRB approach to capital
adequacy for credit risk. The market dominance of the major banks, when coupled with the
concentration of their regulatory capital assessed under the IRB approach, is indicative of the
significance of the ASRF model in protecting the Australian banking sector against insolvency.
It motivates our interest in the sensitivity of model output to parameter variations and model
misspecification. APRA’s support for this research includes access to internal bank data, which
allows us to evaluate model robustness on a portfolio that is representative of the credit exposures
of the Australian banking sector. It distinguishes our research from other empirical studies on
the IRB approach.
We begin in Section 2 by deriving the theoretical foundations, drawn from the literature,
of the model specification of the IRB approach. An asset value factor model of credit risk, it
has its roots in the classical structural approach of Merton (1974). Adapting the single asset
model of Merton to a portfolio of credits, Vasicek (2002) derived a function that transforms
unconditional default probabilities into default probabilities conditional on a single systematic
risk factor. We extend Vasicek’s model of conditional independence to a more general setting,
one not restricted to Gaussian processes. Gordy (2003) established that conditional on a single
systematic risk factor, the portfolio percentage loss converges to its conditional expectation
as the portfolio approaches asymptotic granularity — no single credit exposure accounts for
more than an arbitrarily small share of total portfolio exposure. Then, assuming conditional
independence given a single systematic risk factor, we derive a limiting form of the portfolio
loss distribution for the general case. The model specification of the IRB approach employs an
analytical approximation of credit value-at-risk (VaR). It rests on the proposition, due to Gordy
(2003), that quantiles of the distribution of conditional expectation of portfolio percentage loss
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may be substituted for quantiles of the portfolio loss distribution. We present a more compact
proof of this proposition starting from weaker assumptions.
In generating a portfolio loss distribution we are, in effect, combining marginal loss distribu-
tions of constituent credits into a multivariate distribution capturing default dependence between
obligors. An approach to modelling default dependence, popularised by Li (2000), uses copula
functions, which combine marginal distributions into a multivariate distribution with a chosen
dependence structure. Section 3 derives the single-factor copula model describing default depen-
dence for the general case. Then, we deal with the special case of the one-factor Gaussian copula,
the most commonly applied copula function in credit risk modelling. Recognising that Gauss-
ian distributions in financial applications tend to underestimate tail risk, we proceed to outline
procedures for generating empirical loss distributions described by elliptical copulas, including
Gaussian and Student’s t copulas. Moreover, we illustrate the dependence induced by elliptical
copulas.
In its implementation of the IRB approach to capital adequacy for credit risk, APRA requires
that ADIs set aside provisions for absorbing expected losses, and hold capital against unexpected
losses. Assuming that portfolios are infinitely fine-grained so that idiosyncratic risk is fully diver-
sified away, and a single systematic risk factor explains dependence across obligors, Section 4
describes an analytical approximation for assessing ratings-based capital charges. While real-
world portfolios are not infinitely fine-grained, as a practical matter, credit portfolios of large
banks adequately satisfy the asymptotic granularity condition, so it need not pose an imped-
iment to assessing ratings-based capital charges. Again, our contribution extends the model
specification of the IRB approach to a more general setting than the usual Gaussian case.
Section 5 describes the Basel II capital adequacy reporting of ADIs that supplies data for
our empirical analysis. In Section 6 we measure the rate of convergence, in terms of number of
obligors, of empirical loss distributions to the distribution of conditional expectation of portfolio
percentage loss representing an infinitely fine-grained portfolio. In the process we demonstrate
that Gordy’s proposition, which underpins the IRB approach, holds for a representative credit
portfolio that exhibits sufficient granularity. The IRB approach applies the one-factor Gaussian
copula, in which default dependence is described by the matrix of pairwise correlations between
obligors’ asset values. Section 7 proceeds to evaluate the sensitivity of credit risk capital to
dependence structure, as modelled by asset correlations and elliptical copulas. We conclude by
outlining the direction of future related research.
2. Foundations of the Asymptotic Single Risk Factor Model
In this section we derive the theoretical foundations of the Basel II IRB approach to capital
adequacy for credit risk, and extend its model specification to a more general setting, one not
restricted to Gaussian processes. The IRB approach implements the so-called asymptotic single
risk factor (ASRF) model, an asset value factor model of credit risk. Asset value models posit
that default or survival of a firm depends on the value of its assets at (the end of) a given
risk measurement horizon. If the value of its assets falls below a critical threshold, its default
point, the firm defaults, otherwise it survives. Asset value models have their roots in Merton’s
seminal paper published in 1974. Factor models are a well established, computationally efficient
technique for explaining dependence between variables.
Define set Di, abstractly, as the event that firm i defaults, and denote by pi = P(Di) the
unconditional probability of default (PD) assigned to firm i. The standard model of asset values
is geometric Brownian motion. Let Wi(t) be a Brownian motion, Wi(t) ∼ N (0, t), describing the
variability in asset values of firm i. Then, the value of assets of firm i at time t may be expressed
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in logarithmic form as
logAi(t) = logAi(0) + µit− 12σ2i t+ σi
√
tWi, (2.1)
where latent random Wi(1), which we write Wi, is standard Gaussian, Wi ∼ N (0, 1). Note that
Wi(t) is distributionally equivalent to
√
tWi by the self-similarity property of Brownian motion.
A more precise definition of the event that firm i defaults follows from the postulate of asset
value models of credit risk:
Di =
{
Wi < Φ
−1(pi)
}
, (2.2)
where Φ−1 is the inverse standard Gaussian distribution function. In the sequel we assume that
unconditional PDs are published as market data by the likes of Moody’s KMV and RiskMetrics.
2.1. Conditional Independence Model. Adapting the single asset model of Merton to a
portfolio of credits, Vasicek (2002) derived a function that transforms unconditional PDs into PDs
conditional on a single systematic risk factor. This function is the kernel of the model specification
of the IRB approach. Let the sequence of random variables {Ln} be the percentage loss on a
credit portfolio comprising n ∈ N obligors over a given risk measurement horizon [0, τ ], τ > 0.
We make the assumption that the number of credits in the portfolio equals the number of
distinct obligors, which can be achieved by aggregating multiple credits of an individual obligor
into a single credit. Suppose that exposure at default (EAD) and loss given default (LGD) are
deterministic quantities, and denote by δi ∈ R+ and ηi ∈ [0, 1] the EAD and LGD, respectively,
assigned to obligor i. Also, letDi be the event that obligor i defaults during the risk measurement
horizon. Then, the portfolio percentage loss is given by
Ln =
n∑
i=1
wiηi1Di , (2.3)
where 1Di is the default indicator function, and wi = δi/
∑n
j=1 δj is the exposure weight of
obligor i with
∑n
i=1 wi = 1. Clearly, wi depends on n and could be denoted wi(n), but we adopt
the more concise, and more common, notation for exposure weight.
Assume that latent random variables W1, . . . ,Wn modelling the variability in obligors’ asset
values are standard Gaussian and conditionally independent. Suppose, too, that Wi may be
represented as
Wi =
√
ρi Y +
√
1− ρi Zi, (2.4)
where random variables Z1, . . . , Zn and Y are standard Gaussian and mutually independent,
and ρ1, . . . , ρn ∈ (0, 1) are correlation parameters calibrated to market data. Thus, W1, . . . ,Wn
are conditionally independent given random variable Y , which is common to all obligors. Sys-
tematic risk factor Y may be interpreted as an underlying risk driver or economic factor, with
each realisation describing a scenario of the economy. Random variables Z1, . . . , Zn represent
idiosyncratic, or obligor specific, risk. Representation (2.4), which assumes that asset values are
positively correlated, is taken from Vasicek (2002) and employed in the model specification of
the IRB approach.
Remark 2.1. Let the variability in obligors’ asset values be described by (2.4). Then, the pairwise
correlation between obligors’ asset values Corr(Wi,Wj) =
√
ρiρj .
Substituting representation (2.4) into set (2.2) representing the event of default, the PD of
obligor i conditional on realisation y ∈ R of systematic risk factor Y , or conditional probability
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of default, may be expressed as
pi(y) = P(Di |Y = y) = P
(
Wi < Φ
−1(pi) |Y = y
)
= P
(√
ρi y +
√
1− ρi Zi < Φ−1(pi)
)
= P
(
Zi <
Φ−1(pi)−√ρi y√
1− ρi
)
= Φ
(
Φ−1(pi)−√ρi y√
1− ρi
)
, (2.5)
where pi is the unconditional PD of obligor i. Equation (2.5) transforms unconditional PDs into
PDs conditional on a single systematic risk factor.
Let
ζi(y) =
Φ−1(pi)−√ρi y√
1− ρi = Φ
−1
(
pi(y)
)
(2.6)
for i = 1, . . . , n. Then, given Y = y, the portfolio percentage loss is calculated as
Ln =
n∑
i=1
wiηi1{Zi<ζi(y)}. (2.7)
In the sequel we refer to the model developed in this section as the Gaussian conditional
independence model of a credit portfolio.
2.2. A More General Setting. We proceed to extend the Gaussian conditional independence
model to a more general setting. In Section 2.1 we assume that: (i) defaults are conditionally
independent given a single systematic risk factor; and (ii) obligors’ asset values are modelled as
geometric Brownian motion. The latter assumption implies that latent random variables model-
ling the variability in obligors’ asset values, and their component systematic and idiosyncratic
risk factors, are Gaussian. We now relax this assumption to describe a more general setting.
Definition 2.2. A conditional independence model of a credit portfolio comprising n ∈ N obligors
over a given risk measurement horizon [0, τ ], τ > 0, takes the form:
(1) Let δi ∈ R be the EAD assigned to obligor i, and wi = δi/
∑n
j=1 δj its exposure weight.
Let ηi ∈ [0, 1], γi ∈ (−1, 1) and pi ∈ (0, 1) be the LGD, asset correlation and uncondi-
tional PD, respectively, assigned to obligor i.
(2) Suppose that latent random variables W1, . . . ,Wn are conditionally independent, and
admit representation
Wi = γiY +
√
1− γ2i Zi, (2.8)
where Z1, . . . , Zn and Y are mutually independent random variables. Systematic risk
factor Y is common to all obligors, while Z1, . . . , Zn represent idiosyncratic, or obligor
specific, risk. Denote by F1, . . . , Fn, G1, . . . , Gn and H the continuous and strictly in-
creasing distribution functions of W1, . . . ,Wn, Z1, . . . , Zn and Y , respectively. Clearly,
Fi depends on Gi and H for i = 1, . . . , n.
(3) The event that obligor i defaults during the time interval [0, τ ] is defined by the set
Di =
{
Wi < F
−1
i (pi)
}
(2.9)
for i = 1, . . . , n.
Portfolio percentage loss Ln is calculated by (2.3) where, for the general case, 1Di is the
indicator function of the default event defined by (2.9). Recasting argument (2.6) of the default
indicator function and conditional probability function (2.5) for the general case, we deduce a
formula for portfolio percentage loss conditional on realisation y ∈ R of systematic risk factor Y .
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Thus, given Y = y, portfolio percentage loss under the conditional independence model of Defi-
nition 2.2 is calculated as:
Ln =
n∑
i=1
wiηi1{Zi<ζi(y)}, (2.10)
where
ζi(y) =
F−1i (pi)− γiy√
1− γ2i
= G−1i
(
pi(y)
)
, (2.11)
and
pi(y) = P(Di |Y = y) = Gi
(
F−1i (pi)− γiy√
1− γ2i
)
(2.12)
for i = 1, . . . , n.
Remark 2.3. In the abstract case where conditional PD, as well as unconditional PD and asset
correlation, are known and the state of the economy is sought, we take the inverse of (2.12).
Conditional probability function pi : R→ (0, 1), given by (2.12), is continuous and strictly de-
creasing in y — conditional PD falls (respectively, rises) as the economy improves (deteriorates).
Hence, its inverse p−1i : (0, 1)→ R is strictly decreasing too. In particular,
y = p−1i (x) =
F−1i (pi)−
√
1− γ2i G−1i (x)
γi
(2.13)
for all x ∈ (0, 1).
Remark 2.4. Let y = H−1(1−α), where α ∈ (0, 1). Then, the PD of obligor i conditional on
Y = y may be interpreted as the probability of default of obligor i is no greater than
P
(
Di |Y = H−1(1−α)
)
= pi
(
H−1(1−α)) = Gi
(
F−1i (pi)− γiH−1(1−α)√
1− γ2i
)
(2.14)
in (α× 100)% of economic scenarios.
2.3. Conditional Expectation of Portfolio Percentage Loss. The model specification of
the IRB approach calculates the expectation of portfolio credit losses conditional on realisa-
tion y ∈ R of systematic risk factor Y . Taking expectations of (2.3) and (2.10), respectively, we
define the expected portfolio percentage loss as
E[Ln] =
n∑
i=1
wiηipi, (2.15)
and the conditional expectation of portfolio percentage loss as
E[Ln |Y = y] =
n∑
i=1
wiηipi(y). (2.16)
Remark 2.5. Conditional expectation function E[Ln |Y ] : R→ (0, 1), given by (2.16), is contin-
uous and strictly decreasing in y — conditional expectation of portfolio percentage loss falls
(respectively, rises) as the economy improves (deteriorates).
Key propositions underpinning the model specification of the Basel II IRB approach are
derived for an asymptotic portfolio, often described as infinitely fine-grained, in which no single
credit exposure accounts for more than an arbitrarily small share of total portfolio exposure.
Accordingly, our derivation of the model specification of the IRB approach requires a mathemat-
ically more precise definition of asymptotic granularity.
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Definition 2.6. Let ∆ =
∑∞
k=1 δk be an infinite series whose terms δk ∈ R+ represent EAD
assigned to obligors constituting a credit portfolio:
(1) The partial sums of ∆ of order n, are defined for n ∈ N as
∆n =
n∑
k=1
δk.
(2) An asymptotic portfolio satisfies
∞∑
n=1
(
δn
∆n
)2
<∞.
Remark 2.7. An application of Kronecker’s lemma (Gut, 2005, Lemma 6.5.1) shows that exposure
weights of credits constituting an asymptotic portfolio shrink very rapidly as the number of
obligors increases:
∞∑
k=1
(
δk
∆k
)2
<∞ =⇒ 1
∆2n
n∑
k=1
δ2k =
n∑
k=1
w2k → 0 as n→∞. (2.17)
Remark 2.8. Suppose that a ≤ δk ≤ b where 0 < a ≤ b <∞ for all k ∈ N. Then,
∆n =
n∑
k=1
δk ≥ na→∞ as n→∞, (2.18)
and
∞∑
n=1
(
δn
∆n
)2
=
∞∑
n=1
δ2n
(
∑n
k=1 δk)
2 ≤
∞∑
n=1
b2
(na)2
=
b2
a2
∞∑
n=1
1
n2
<∞, (2.19)
where (2.19) converges by the p-series test (see, e.g., Wade, 2004, Corollary 6.13). Assuming that
EAD assigned to individual obligors is bounded, an entirely uncontroversial claim, total EAD
of an asymptotic portfolio diverges, but (2.19) satisfies the definition of an asymptotic portfolio
(Bluhm et al., 2010, Example 2.5.3).
Gordy (2003, Proposition 1) established that, conditional on a single systematic risk factor, the
portfolio percentage loss converges, almost surely, to its conditional expectation as the portfolio
approaches asymptotic granularity.
Proposition 2.9. Assume a conditional independence model of an asymptotic credit portfolio.
Then,
lim
n→∞
(
Ln −
n∑
i=1
wiηipi(Y )
)
= 0, P-a.s. (2.20)
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Remark 2.10. The sequence {Ln}n∈N is bounded, but it is not monotone. Indicator function
1{Zi<ζi(y)} ∈ {0, 1} and ηi ∈ [0, 1] for i = 1, . . . , n, and
∑n
i=1 wi = 1 for all n ∈ N, where wi
depends on n. The dependence of exposure weights on the number of obligors is clear when
expressed as wi = δi/
∑n
j=1 δj . Consequently, Ln, and hence
∑n
i=1 wiηipi(y), may not converge
as n→∞.
Remark 2.11. In an asymptotic portfolio idiosyncratic risk is fully diversified away, so portfolio
percentage loss Ln depends only on systematic risk factor Y .
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Remark 2.12. As a practical matter, credit portfolios of large banks are typically near the asymp-
totic granularity of Definition 2.6. Thus, given Y = y, (2.16) provides a statistically accurate
estimate of percentage loss on a portfolio containing a large number of credits without concen-
tration in a few names dominating the rest of the portfolio.
2.4. Limiting Form of Portfolio Loss Distribution. Risk capital for a credit portfolio is
determined from its parametric or empirical loss distribution. Assuming conditional indepen-
dence given a single systematic risk factor, Vasicek (2002) derived the parametric loss distribution
function of an asymptotic, homogeneous credit portfolio. In Section 2.3 we define an asymptotic
portfolio, here we define a homogeneous portfolio.
Definition 2.13. Assume a conditional independence model of a credit portfolio. A homogeneous
portfolio comprising n obligors satisfies:
(1) Parameters γi = γ for i = 1, . . . , n in representation (2.8) of latent random variables
W1, . . . ,Wn.
(2) Random variables Z1, . . . , Zn are drawn from the same distribution described by the
continuous and strictly increasing distribution functionG. Also, denote by F the common
distribution function of W1, . . . ,Wn.
(3) Obligors are assigned the same unconditional PD and LGD, that is, pi = p and ηi = η
for i = 1, . . . , n.
Remark 2.14. From the properties of a homogeneous credit portfolio we infer that pi(y) = p(y)
for i = 1, . . . , n, and all realisations y ∈ R of systematic risk factor Y .
The following result, derived for the general case, is a corollary of Proposition 2.9.
Corollary 2.15. Assume a conditional independence model of an asymptotic, homogeneous
credit portfolio. Then,
lim
n→∞
Ln = ηp(Y ), P-a.s. (2.21)
Accordingly, the portfolio loss distribution satisfies
lim
n→∞
P(Ln ≤ l) = 1−H
(
F−1(p)−
√
1− γ2G−1(l/η)
γ
)
(2.22)
for all l ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Corollary 2.15 generalises the Vasicek (2002) formulation of the loss distribution function of an
asymptotic, homogeneous portfolio, which models default dependence as a multivariate Gaussian
process.
2.5. Credit Value-at-Risk. In determining regulatory capital, the Basel II IRB approach
applies a risk measure to assign a single numerical value to a random credit loss. The chosen risk
measure is value-at-risk (VaR), one of the most widely used measures in risk management. VaR
is an extreme quantile of a loss, or profit and loss, distribution that is rarely exceeded. Firstly,
we define quantiles of a distribution.
Definition 2.16. Let X be a random variable, and let α ∈ (0, 1). Then the α quantile of the
distribution of X is
qα(X) = inf{x ∈ R : P(X ≤ x) ≥ α}. (2.23)
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Remark 2.17. If X has a continuous and strictly increasing distribution function F , then the α
quantile of the distribution of X is given by
qα(X) = F
−1(α), (2.24)
where F−1(α), the inverse distribution function evaluated at α, is the number qα(X) ∈ R such
that F (qα(X)) = α.
Adopting the convention that a loss is a positive number, we now define credit VaR.
Definition 2.18. Credit VaR at the confidence level α ∈ (0, 1) over a given risk measurement
horizon is the largest portfolio percentage loss l such that the probability of a loss Ln exceeding l
is at most (1−α):
VaRα(Ln) = inf{l ∈ R : P(Ln > l) ≤ 1−α}. (2.25)
In probabilistic terms, VaRα(Ln) is simply the α quantile of the portfolio loss distribution.
Although computationally expensive, Monte Carlo simulation is routinely employed to generate
the empirical loss distribution and determine VaR of a credit portfolio. Suppose that we generate
the loss distribution of a credit portfolio comprising n obligors by simulation of (2.10) param-
eterised by (2.11). Let Monte Carlo simulation perform N iterations. For each iteration we draw
from their respective distributions random variable Y representing systematic risk, and random
variables Z1, . . . , Zn representing obligor specific risks. Then, conditional on realisation yk ∈ R
of systematic risk factor Y describing a scenario of the economy, the portfolio percentage loss
over the risk measurement horizon is computed as
Ln,k =
n∑
i=1
wiηi1{Zi,k<ζi(yk)} (2.26)
for iterations k = 1, . . . , N . Monte Carlo simulation computes N portfolio percentage losses
constituting the empirical loss distribution described by the function (Bluhm et al., 2010, pp.
30–32):
F (l) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
1{0≤Ln,k≤l}. (2.27)
VaRα(Ln), the α quantile of the empirical loss distribution, is the maximum credit loss at
the α confidence level over a given risk measurement horizon. Expected loss is estimated by
calculating the average portfolio percentage loss over N iterations of the simulation:
E[Ln] =
1
N
N∑
k=1
Ln,k. (2.28)
An analytical model of the portfolio loss distribution, on the other hand, facilitates the fast
calculation of credit VaR. In the limiting case of an asymptotic, homogeneous credit port-
folio, VaRα(Ln) may be determined analytically from distribution function (2.22). However,
the assumptions of Corollary 2.15 are too restrictive for real-world credit portfolios. The risk
factor model for ratings-based capital charges derived by Gordy (2003) relaxes the homogeneity
assumption. His analysis proceeds assuming that:
(1) Portfolios are infinitely fine-grained so that idiosyncratic risk is fully diversified away.
(2) A single systematic risk factor explains dependence across obligors.
Under these weaker assumptions, and subject to additional technical conditions, Gordy estab-
lished that quantiles of the distribution of conditional expectation of portfolio percentage loss
may be substituted for quantiles of the portfolio loss distribution. The statement and proof of
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Proposition 5 of Gordy (2003), which leads to an analytical approximation of credit VaR, is rele-
gated to Appendix C. Here, we present a version of this proposition that relaxes the additional
technical conditions imposed by Gordy, resulting in a more compact, or parsimonious, proof.
Proposition 2.19. Assume a conditional independence model of a credit portfolio compris-
ing n obligors. Denote by ϕn(y) the conditional expectation function E[Ln | y] : R→ (0, 1) given
by (2.16), and assume that the sequence {ϕn}n∈N of real-valued functions satisfies:
(1) For every n ∈ N, function ϕn is strictly monotonic.
(2) For every y ∈ R and ε > 0 there is a δ(ε) ∈ R\{0} and N(δ, ε) ∈ N such that n > N(δ, ε)
implies [
ϕn(y)− ε, ϕn(y) + ε
] ⊂ [ϕn(y − δ(ε)), ϕn(y + δ(ε))],
where δ depends on ε, and N depends on δ and ε, in general. While δ depends on ε, and
may also depend on y, we assume that it is independent of n.
(3) For every ξ > 0 there is an ε > 0 such that 0 <
∣∣δ(ε)∣∣ < ξ, that is, δ(ε) tends to zero as
ε tends to zero.
(4) For every y ∈ R and ε > 0 there is a δ(ε) ∈ R\{0} and N(δ, ε) ∈ N such that n > N(δ, ε)
implies [
ϕn
(
y − δ(ε)), ϕn(y + δ(ε))] ⊂ [ϕn(y)− ε, ϕn(y) + ε],
where δ is independent of n.
Then,
lim
n→∞
(
Ln − ϕn(y)
)
= 0, P-a.s. ⇒ lim
n→∞
∣∣ qα(Ln)− ϕn(q1−α(Y ))∣∣ = 0 (2.29)
for all α ∈ (0, 1).
Remark 2.20. We argue that Conditions (1)–(4) of Proposition 2.19 are quite reasonable assump-
tions for real-world credit portfolios. Observe that the conditional expectation function ϕn, given
by (2.16), is continuous and strictly decreasing in y by Remark 2.5. Therefore, it satisfies Con-
dition (1), which is also a condition of Lemma 2.22 and Corollary 2.23, both used in the proof
of Proposition 2.19.
For Conditions (2)–(4) to hold, the curve of ϕn cannot have horizontal or vertical segments in
the neighbourhood of q1−α(Y ). This is guaranteed by constraints δ(ε) ∈ R \ {0}, 0 <
∣∣δ(ε)∣∣ < ξ,
and δ(ε) ∈ R \ {0}. By inspection of (2.12), Conditions (2)–(4) are satisfied if pi and γ2i are
bounded away from zero and one for i = 1, . . . , n. Otherwise, ϕn would no longer depend on y,
thus violating Condition (1). As a practical matter, if pi were equal to zero, then the capital
charge assessed on credit i would be zero; and if pi were equal to one, then the product of EAD
and LGD assigned to obligor i would be charged against profit and loss.
Remark 2.21. If on some open interval I containing q1−α(Y ), ϕn were also differentiable on I,
then Conditions (2)–(4) would be satisfied if
−∞ < −Θ ≤ ϕ′n(y) ≤ −θ < 0
for all y ∈ I, with θ > 0 and Θ > 0 independent of n. Indeed, Proposition C.1 (Gordy, 2003,
Proposition 5) assumes that this condition holds on an open interval I containing q1−α(Y ).
Recall that VaRα(Ln) = qα(Ln). So, Proposition 2.19 asserts that the α quantile of the
distribution of E[Ln |Y ], which is associated with the (1−α) quantile of the distribution of Y ,
may be substituted for the α quantile of the distribution of Ln (i.e., credit VaR at the α confidence
level over a given risk measurement horizon). The IRB approach rests on Proposition 2.19. Its
proof, presented below, relies on the following lemmas and corollary. Note that in this section,
F1, . . . , Fn denote a sequence of distribution functions, as distinct from the notation adopted in
Section 2.2.
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Lemma 2.22. Let {gn}n∈N be a sequence of real-valued functions gn : R→ R that satisfies Con-
ditions (1)–(3) of Proposition 2.19. Then, for every b ∈ R,
lim
n→∞
(
an − gn(b)
)
= 0 ⇒ lim
n→∞
g−1n (an) = b. (2.30)
Proof. The sufficient condition for the conclusion in (2.30) states that for every ε > 0 there is an
N0(ε) ∈ N such that n > N0(ε) implies ∣∣an − gn(b)∣∣ ≤ ε,
which may be expressed as
an ∈ [gn(b)− ε, gn(b) + ε] ⊂
[
gn
(
b− δ(ε)), gn(b+ δ(ε))],
where the subset relation holds when Condition (2) is satisfied. Observe that since gn is strictly
monotonic for every n ∈ N by hypothesis, gn is one-to-one and g−1n
(
gn(b)
)
= b. Also, δ(ε) > 0
if gn is strictly increasing, and δ(ε) < 0 if gn is strictly decreasing. Then, an application of the
inverse function g−1n yields
g−1n (an) ∈
[
b− ∣∣δ(ε)∣∣, b+ ∣∣δ(ε)∣∣] ⊂ [b − ξ, b+ ξ],
where the subset relation holds when Condition (3) is satisfied. Choosing N(δ, ε) = N0(ε)
such that ξ is arbitrarily close to zero establishes the necessary condition of the hypothesis
in (2.30). 
Corollary 2.23. Let Xn and Y be random variables defined on a common probability space with
distribution functions Fn and H, respectively. If a sequence {gn}n∈N of real-valued functions
gn : R→ R satisfies Conditions (1)–(3) of Proposition 2.19, then
lim
n→∞
(
Xn − gn(y)
)
= 0, P-a.s. ⇒ lim
n→∞
g−1n (Xn) = Y. (2.31)
Moreover, if H is continuous, then for every realisation y ∈ R of Y ,
lim
n→∞
Fn
(
gn(y)
)
= H(y) (2.32)
when functions gn are strictly increasing, and
lim
n→∞
Fn
(
gn(y)
)
= 1−H(y) (2.33)
when functions gn are strictly decreasing.
Proof. Random variables are real-valued functions on some probability space, so (2.31) is an
immediate consequence of Lemma 2.22.
The almost sure convergence of the sufficient condition for the conclusion in (2.31) implies
pointwise convergence (see, e.g., Wade, 2004, Definition 7.1) of the sequence of distribution
functions of g−1n (Xn) to the distribution function of Y at every point of continuity of H . If H
is continuous, then convergence occurs for every realisation y ∈ R of Y . It follows from the
necessary condition of the hypothesis in (2.31) that
P
(
g−1n (Xn) ≤ y
)
= P
(
Xn ≤ gn(y)
)
= Fn
(
gn(y)
)
converges to P(Y ≤ y) = H(y) as n → ∞ if functions gn are strictly increasing, which estab-
lishes (2.32). Similarly,
P
(
g−1n (Xn) ≤ y
)
= P
(
Xn ≥ gn(y)
)
= 1− P(Xn ≤ gn(y)) = 1− Fn(gn(y))
converges to P(Y ≤ y) = H(y) as n → ∞ if functions gn are strictly decreasing, which estab-
lishes (2.33). 
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Lemma 2.24. Let Y be a random variable with continuous and strictly increasing distribution
function H, and let g : R → R be a strictly monotonic function. Then, the α quantile of the
distribution function of g(Y ) is
qα(g(Y )) = g
(
H−1(α)
)
(2.34)
if g is strictly increasing, and
qα(g(Y )) = g
(
H−1(1− α)) (2.35)
if g is strictly decreasing.
Proof. By Definition 2.16, the α quantile of g(Y ) is
qα(g(Y )) = inf
{
g(y) ∈ R : P(g(Y ) ≤ g(y)) ≥ α}. (2.36)
Since H is continuous and strictly increasing by hypothesis, the α quantile of the distribution
of Y is given by
qα(Y ) = H
−1(α), (2.37)
where H−1(α) is the inverse distribution function evaluated at α (Remark 2.17). Observe that
if g is strictly increasing, then
P
(
g(Y ) ≤ g(qα(Y ))
)
= P
(
g(Y ) ≤ g(H−1(α)))
= P
(
Y ≤ H−1(α))
= α,
where the first equality is a consequence of (2.37), and the second equality is the result of an
application of inverse function g−1. Hence, (2.34) follows from (2.36). By a parallel argument,
if g is strictly decreasing, then
P
(
g(Y ) ≤ g(q1−α(Y ))
)
= P
(
g(Y ) ≤ g(H−1(1−α)))
= P
(
Y ≥ H−1(1−α))
= 1− P(Y ≤ H−1(1−α))
= α,
which establishes (2.35). 
Proof of Proposition 2.19. Fix α ∈ (0, 1), set ϕn(y) = qα(ϕn(Y )), and denote by Fn the distri-
bution function of Ln. By appealing to results due to Corollary 2.23 and Lemma 2.24 for strictly
decreasing functions ϕn, observe that
lim
n→∞
Fn
(
qα(ϕn(Y ))
)
= lim
n→∞
Fn
(
ϕn(H
−1(1−α))) = lim
n→∞
Fn
(
ϕn(q1−α(Y ))
)
= 1−H( q1−α(Y ) ) = 1−H(H−1(1−α)) = α. (2.38)
The first equality follows from (2.35), the second from (2.37), the third from (2.33), and the
fourth from (2.37) again. Notice that δ(ε) > 0 if ϕn is strictly increasing, and δ(ε) < 0 if ϕn
is strictly decreasing. By Remark 2.5, ϕn(y) = E[Ln | y] is strictly decreasing, thus satisfying
Condition (1). Then, on the basis of (2.38) and subject to Condition (4), lower and upper
bounds, respectively, on the α quantile of Ln are deduced:
lim
n→∞
Fn
(
ϕn(q1−α(Y )− δ(ε))
)
= 1−H( q1−α(Y ) + ∣∣δ(ε)∣∣) < α,
and
lim
n→∞
Fn
(
ϕn(q1−α(Y ) + δ(ε))
)
= 1−H( q1−α(Y )− ∣∣δ(ε)∣∣) > α,
which may be expressed as
qα(Ln) ∈
[
ϕn
(
q1−α(Y )− δ(ε)
)
, ϕn
(
q1−α(Y ) + δ(ε)
)]
.
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Finally, by Condition (4), for every ε > 0 there is a δ(ε) ∈ R and N(δ, ε) ∈ N such that
n > N(δ, ε) implies
qα(Ln) ∈
[
ϕn
(
q1−α(Y )
)− ε, ϕn( q1−α(Y ) )+ ε],
which establishes the necessary condition of the hypothesis in (2.29). 
3. Copula Approach to Modelling Default Dependence
In generating a portfolio loss distribution we are, in effect, combining marginal loss distribu-
tions of constituent credits into a multivariate distribution capturing default dependence between
obligors. An approach to modelling default dependence, popularised by Li (2000), uses copula
functions — a statistical technique for combining marginal distributions into a multivariate dis-
tribution with a chosen dependence structure.
3.1. Single-Factor Copula Model. Consider a credit portfolio comprising n obligors, and let
(2.9) define the event that obligor i defaults. We may express the unconditional PD of obligor i,
for the general case introduced in Section 2.2, as
P(Di) = P
(
Wi < F
−1
i (pi)
)
, (3.1)
and the joint default probability as
P
(
1D1 = 1, . . . ,1Dn = 1
)
= P
(
W1 < F
−1
1 (p1), . . . ,Wn < F
−1
n (pn)
)
. (3.2)
In the sequel, R denotes the extended real number line [−∞,∞]. Let (u1, . . . , un) = (p1, . . . , pn)
be a vector in [0, 1]n, and (W1, . . . ,Wn) a vector of latent random variables with continuous
and strictly increasing distribution functions F1, . . . , Fn, respectively. Suppose that F is an n-
dimensional distribution function with margins F1, . . . , Fn. Then, by Sklar’s theorem (see, e.g.,
Nelsen, 2006, Theorem 2.10.9), there is a unique n-copula C such that for all (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ Rn,
F (w1, . . . , wn) = C
(
F1(w1), . . . , Fn(wn)
)
. (3.3)
Now, for any (u1, . . . , un) ∈ [0, 1]n,
C(u1, . . . , un) = F
(
F−11 (u1), . . . , F
−1
n (un)
)
= P
(
W1 < F
−1
1 (u1), . . . ,Wn < F
−1
n (un)
)
, (3.4)
by a corollary to Sklar’s theorem (see, e.g., Nelsen, 2006, Corollary 2.10.10).
Assuming that defaults are conditionally independent given systematic risk factor Y , latent
random variables W1, . . . ,Wn may be represented as in (2.8):
Wi = γiY +
√
1− γ2i Zi,
where Z1, . . . , Zn and Y are mutually independent random variables with continuous and strictly
increasing distribution functionsG1, . . . , Gn andH , respectively, and γi ∈ (−1, 1) for i = 1, . . . , n.
Lemma 3.1. Assume a conditional independence model of a credit portfolio comprising n obligors.
Then, default dependence may be described by the single-factor copula function associated with
(W1, . . . ,Wn):
C(u1, . . . , un) =
∫ ∞
−∞
(
n∏
i=1
Gi
(
F−1i (ui)− γiy√
1− γ2i
))
dH(y) (3.5)
for any (u1, . . . , un) ∈ [0, 1]n.
Proof. See Appendix D. 
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Remark 3.2. Monte Carlo simulation computes the portfolio percentage loss for a very large
sample of realisations y ∈ R of systematic risk factor Y . For each realisation y we use (2.10)
to determine the number of defaults k, and calculate portfolio percentage loss by summing the
product of exposure weight and LGD for credits that have defaulted. This simulation procedure
is discussed in some detail in Section 6. In generating the empirical loss distribution of a credit
portfolio by simulation (2.26), we are implicitly applying the single-factor copula model using
Monte Carlo methods.
3.2. One-Factor Gaussian Copula. Throughout this section, as the title implies, we restrict
our attention to the special case in which default dependence is modelled as a multivariate
Gaussian process. Consider a credit portfolio comprising n obligors. Substituting the inverse
standard Gaussian distribution function into (3.1) and (3.2), the unconditional PD of obligor i
becomes
P(Di) = P
(
Wi < Φ
−1(pi)
)
, (3.6)
and the joint default probability is given by
P
(
1D1 = 1, . . . ,1Dn = 1
)
= P
(
W1 < Φ
−1(p1), . . . ,Wn < Φ
−1(pn)
)
. (3.7)
Let (u1, . . . , un) = (p1, . . . , pn) be a vector in [0, 1]
n, and choose a dependence structure described
by correlation matrix Γ. Then, the unique Gaussian copula associated with (W1, . . . ,Wn) is a
particular case of (3.4):
CΓ(u1, . . . , un) = ΦΓ
(
Φ−1(u1), . . . ,Φ
−1(un)
)
(3.8)
= P
(
W1 < Φ
−1(u1), . . . ,Wn < Φ
−1(un)
)
,
for any (u1, . . . , un) ∈ [0, 1]n, where ΦΓ is the multivariate standard Gaussian distribution func-
tion with correlation matrix Γ.
Now suppose that defaults are conditionally independent given a single systematic risk factor.
Then, default dependence is described by correlation matrix
Γ̂ =

1
√
ρ1ρ2 · · · √ρ1ρn√
ρ1ρ2 1 · · · √ρ2ρn
...
...
. . .
...√
ρ1ρn
√
ρ2ρn · · · 1
 , (3.9)
where
√
ρiρj = Corr(Wi,Wj) is the pairwise correlation between obligors’ asset values (Remark
2.1), and
√
ρi is the exposure of obligor i to systematic risk factor Y in (2.4). This special case
of the Gaussian copula is the so-called one-factor Gaussian copula, the most commonly applied
copula function in credit risk modelling (MacKenzie and Spears, 2012). The following result, a
corollary of Lemma 3.1, provides an expression for the one-factor Gaussian copula.
Corollary 3.3. Assume a Gaussian conditional independence model of a credit portfolio compris-
ing n obligors with pairwise asset correlations defined by matrix (3.9). Then, default dependence
may be described by the one-factor Gaussian copula associated with (W1, . . . ,Wn):
CΓ̂(u1, . . . , un) = ΦΓ̂
(
Φ−1(u1), . . . ,Φ
−1(un)
)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
(
n∏
i=1
Φ
(
Φ−1(ui)−√ρi y√
1− ρi
))
φ(y) dy (3.10)
for any (u1, . . . , un) ∈ [0, 1]n.
Proof. See Appendix D. 
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Remark 3.4. Appealing to Proposition 2.19, the Basel II IRB approach applies the one-factor
Gaussian copula to calculate the α quantile of the distribution of E[Ln |Y ], an analytical approx-
imation of the α quantile of the distribution of Ln, or VaRα(Ln).
3.3. Elliptical Copulas. In applying the one-factor Gaussian copula to calculate regulatory
capital for credit risk, the IRB approach implicitly assumes that a multivariate Gaussian dis-
tribution accurately models tail risk of credit portfolios. But, it is generally acknowledged that
models which assume that financial data follow a Gaussian distribution tend to underestimate tail
risk. For one, Gaussian copulas do not exhibit tail dependence — the tendency for extreme obser-
vations (i.e., credit defaults) to occur simultaneously for all random variables. Under a Gaussian
copula defaults are said to be asymptotically independent in the upper tail (Embrechts et al.,
2002). Section 7.2 examines the effect of tail dependence by measuring the sensitivity of credit
risk capital to dependence structure as modelled by elliptical copulas, including Gaussian and
Student’s t copulas. We abbreviate the latter by t-copula.
Let (X1, . . . , Xn) be a vector of latent random variables modelling default dependence of a
portfolio comprising n obligors. We proceed to illustrate the dependence induced by a variety of
elliptical copulas, and outline procedures for randomly generating observations drawn from the
resultant multivariate distributions (Bluhm et al., 2010, pp. 106–108):
• One-factor Gaussian copula. Observations X1, . . . , Xn are randomly generated with
Xi =
√
ρi Y +
√
1− ρi Zi, (3.11)
where random variables Z1, . . . , Zn and Y are standard Gaussian and mutually indepen-
dent, and correlation parameters ρ1, . . . , ρn ∈ (0, 1). That is, we sample (X1, . . . , Xn)
from the distribution induced by Gaussian copula (3.8) with correlation matrix (3.9).
Note that (3.11) is simply the conditionally independent representation expressed in (2.4).
• Product copula with Gaussian margins. The product copula generates independent,
and therefore uncorrelated, standard Gaussian random variables (Embrechts et al., 2003,
Theorem 8.2.5). So, observationsX1, . . . , Xn are independently drawn from the standard
Gaussian distribution. That is, we sample (X1, . . . , Xn) from the distribution induced
by Gaussian copula (3.8) with correlation matrix In, the n-by-n identity matrix.
• t-copula with ν degrees of freedom and t-distributed margins. Observations X1, . . . , Xn
are randomly generated with
Xi =
√
ν
V
(√
ρi Y +
√
1− ρi Zi
)
, (3.12)
where Z1, . . . , Zn and Y ∼ N (0, 1), V ∼ χ2(ν), and Z1, . . . , Zn, Y and V are mutually
independent. Scaling (2.4) by
√
ν/V transforms standard Gaussian random variables
into t-distributed random variables with ν degrees of freedom. Vector (X1, . . . , Xn)
inherits correlation matrix (3.9).
• t-copula with ν degrees of freedom and Gaussian margins. Observations X1, . . . , Xn are
randomly generated with
Xi = Φ
−1
(
Φν
(√
ν
V
(√
ρi Y +
√
1− ρi Zi
)))
, (3.13)
where Φ−1 is the inverse standard Gaussian distribution function, and Φν is the Student’s
t distribution function with ν degrees of freedom.
The bivariate scatter plots in Figure 1 illustrate the dependence induced by the elliptical
copulas described above. For each copula, except the product copula, we set ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.170, the
exposure-weighted asset correlation of the representative credit portfolio described in Section 5.
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Figure 1. Bivariate scatter plots illustrate the dependence induced by a variety
of elliptical copulas. Each point corresponds to an ordered pair (X1, X2). Except
for the product copula where X1 and X2 are uncorrelated, ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.170, the
exposure-weighted average asset correlation of the representative credit portfolio
described in Section 5.
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Remark 3.5. The dependence exhibited by the one-factor Gaussian copula becomes apparent
when compared with the product copula, which generates uncorrelated standard Gaussian ran-
dom variables. In contrast to Gaussian copulas, t-copulas admit tail dependence with fewer
degrees of freedom producing stronger dependence. When the t-copula is applied to combine
Gaussian margins and t-distributed margins, respectively, the former is more tightly distributed.
Assuming that asset values follow a log-normal distribution, the distribution of (X1, . . . , Xn) is
determined by the copula function chosen to combine its margins. Section 2.5 outlines the proce-
dure for generating the loss distribution of a credit portfolio comprising n obligors by simulation
of (2.10). In an implementation of the one-factor Gaussian copula, the default indicator func-
tion of (2.10) is parameterised by (2.6). Monte Carlo simulation performs N iterations, (2.26)
calculates the portfolio percentage loss for each iteration, and (2.27) describes the empirical loss
distribution.
In relation to the t-copula with Gaussian margins, we continue to assume that unconditional
PDs scaled to a given risk measurement horizon are published as market data. Substituting (3.12)
into (2.9), we define the event that obligor i defaults during the risk measurement horizon by
the set
Di =
{√
ν
V
(√
ρi Y +
√
1− ρi Zi
)
< Φ−1ν (pi)
}
. (3.14)
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Then, the PD of obligor i conditional on Y = y and V = v is deducible (Bluhm et al., 2010,
pp. 109–111):
pi(y, v) = P
(√
ν
V
(√
ρi Y +
√
1− ρi Zi
)
< Φ−1ν (pi) |Y = y, V = v
)
= P
(
Zi <
√
v/ν Φ−1ν (pi)−
√
ρi y√
1− ρi
)
= Φ
(√
v/ν Φ−1ν (pi)−
√
ρi y√
1− ρi
)
. (3.15)
Let
ζi(y, v) =
√
v/ν Φ−1ν (pi)−√ρi y√
1− ρi (3.16)
for i = 1, . . . , n. Now, given Y = y and V = v, the portfolio percentage loss is calculated as
Ln =
n∑
i=1
wiηi1{Zi<ζi(y,v)}. (3.17)
Suppose that we generate the loss distribution of a portfolio comprising n obligors by sim-
ulation of (3.17), an implementation of the t-copula with Gaussian margins. Let Monte Carlo
simulation perform N iterations. For each iteration we draw from the standard Gaussian distri-
bution random variables Z1, . . . , Zn and Y , and from the chi-square distribution with ν degrees
of freedom random variable V . Then, given Y = yk and V = vk, the portfolio percentage loss
over the risk measurement horizon is computed as
Ln,k =
n∑
i=1
wiηi1{Zi,k<ζi(yk,vk)} (3.18)
for iterations k = 1, . . . , N . Again, (2.27) describes the empirical loss distribution.
4. Model Specification of the Internal Ratings-Based Approach
Under the Basel II Accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006), ADIs assess cap-
ital adequacy for credit risk using either the standardised approach or, subject to approval, the
IRB approach. Our concern is with the theoretical foundations and empirical analysis of the
latter approach. In keeping with the Basel II IRB approach to capital adequacy for credit risk,
the relevant prudential standard of APRA (2008) requires that ADIs set aside provisions for
absorbing expected losses, and hold capital against unexpected losses.
Definition 4.1. Unexpected loss on a credit portfolio at the α confidence level over a given risk
measurement horizon is the difference between credit VaR (with the same confidence level and
time horizon) and expected loss.
Recall that Ln denotes the portfolio percentage loss on a credit portfolio comprising n obligors.
Then, VaRα(Ln) denotes the portfolio percentage loss at the α confidence level over a given risk
measurement horizon, and E[Ln] the expected portfolio percentage loss. We define credit risk
capital consistent with the IRB approach of the Basel II Accord and the relevant prudential
standard of APRA.
Definition 4.2. Let credit risk capital be held against unexpected losses. Then,
Kα(Ln) = VaRα(Ln)− E[Ln] (4.1)
is the capital charge (at the α confidence level over a given risk measurement horizon) as a
percentage of EAD on a credit portfolio comprising n obligors.
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Appealing to Definition 4.2 and Proposition 2.19, we deduce a function for calculating capital
held against unexpected losses on an asymptotic credit portfolio.
Proposition 4.3. Assume a conditional independence model of an asymptotic credit portfolio.
Then,
lim
n→∞
Kα(Ln) = lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
wiηiGi
(
F−1i (pi)− γiH−1(1−α)√
1− γ2i
)
− lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
wiηipi, (4.2)
assuming that the limits on the right-hand side of (4.2) are well defined.
Proof. See Appendix E. 
Proposition 4.3 applies to the abstract case of an infinitely fine-grained credit portfolio for
which total EAD diverges to ∞ (Remark 2.8). However, in the real world a credit portfolio
contains a finite number of obligors, each assigned a positive and finite EAD. Hence, portfolio
EAD is positive and finite, and so is the assessed capital charge, which may be expressed as a
percentage of EAD. Remark 2.12 highlights that while real-world portfolios are not infinitely fine-
grained, as a practical matter, credit portfolios of large banks are typically near the asymptotic
granularity of Definition 2.6. For the practical application of Proposition 4.3 we redefine credit
risk capital for finite portfolios that exhibit “sufficient” granularity.
Definition 4.4. Let credit risk capital be held against unexpected losses. Then, in practice, the
capital charge (at the α confidence level over a given risk measurement horizon) as a percentage
of EAD on a credit portfolio comprising n obligors that “adequately” satisfies the asymptotic
granularity condition of Definition 2.6 may be assessed as
K˜α(Ln) = E
[
Ln |Y = H−1(1−α)
]− E[Ln]. (4.3)
Expanding (4.3), the capital charge as a percentage of EAD on a credit portfolio containing
a finite number of obligors, n, that exhibits sufficient granularity is calculated as
K˜α(Ln) =
n∑
i=1
wiηipi
(
H−1(1−α))− n∑
i=1
wiηipi
=
n∑
i=1
wiηiGi
(
F−1i (pi)− γiH−1(1−α)√
1− γ2i
)
−
n∑
i=1
wiηipi. (4.4)
The ASRF model developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) models
default dependence as a multivariate Gaussian process. Recasting (4.4) for the Gaussian case,
the capital charge (at the α confidence level over a given risk measurement horizon) on a near
asymptotic portfolio comprising n obligors is calculated as
K˜α(Ln) =
n∑
i=1
wiηiΦ
(
Φ−1(pi)−√ρi Φ−1(1−α)√
1− ρi
)
−
n∑
i=1
wiηipi
=
n∑
i=1
wiηiΦ
(
Φ−1(pi) +
√
ρi Φ
−1(α)√
1− ρi
)
−
n∑
i=1
wiηipi. (4.5)
The second equality follows from the symmetry of the standard Gaussian density function. Note
that the kernel of ASRF model (4.5) transforms unconditional PDs into PDs conditional on
systematic risk factor Y using (2.5).
Under the Basel II IRB approach regulatory capital is determined at the 99.9% confidence
level over a one-year horizon — a 0.1% probability that credit losses will exceed provisions and
capital over the subsequent year. In practice, it incorporates a maturity adjustment to account
for the greater likelihood of downgrades for longer-term claims, the effects of which are stronger
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for claims with higher credit ratings. We omit the maturity adjustment from our mathematical
derivation and empirical study of the ASRF model. Thus, regulatory capital for a near asymptotic
credit portfolio comprising n obligors is assessed as
K˜99.9%(Ln) =
n∑
i=1
wiηiΦ
(
Φ−1(pi) +
√
ρi Φ
−1(0.999)√
1− ρi
)
−
n∑
i=1
wiηipi. (4.6)
Remark 4.5. In view of Remark 2.4, but with reference to (2.5), the default probability of obligor i
is no greater than
P
(
Di |Y = Φ−1(0.001)
)
= pi(−3.090) = Φ
(
Φ−1(pi) +
√
ρi Φ
−1(0.999)√
1− ρi
)
(4.7)
in 99.9% of economic scenarios.
Remark 4.6. BCBS (2005) claims that the IRB approach sets regulatory capital for credit risk
at a level where losses exceed it, “on average, once in a thousand years.” Qualifying this informal
statement of probability, BCBS cautions that the 99.9% confidence level was chosen because
tier 2 capital “does not have the loss absorbing capacity of tier 1”, and “to protect against
estimation error” in model inputs as well as “other model uncertainties.” With provisions and
capital amounting to as little as 2.0–3.0% of EAD under the IRB approach, perhaps the claim
of protection against insolvency due to credit losses at the 99.9% confidence level should be
interpreted as providing a margin for misspecification of the ASRF model, and not literally
protection against a “one in a thousand year” event. The choice of confidence level for the ASRF
model may also have been influenced by the desire to produce regulatory capital requirements
that are uncontroversial vis-à-vis Basel I. These qualifying remarks warn against the complacency
engendered by the high confidence level chosen for the IRB approach.
5. Empirical Data
Under its implementation of Basel II, APRA requires ADIs to assess capital adequacy for
credit, market and operational risks. ADIs determine regulatory capital for credit risk using
either the standardised approach or, subject to approval, the IRB approach. The former applies
prescribed risk weights to credit exposures based on asset class and credit rating grade to arrive
at an estimate of RWA. Then, the minimum capital requirement is simply 8% of RWA. The
standardised approach, which is an extension of Basel I, is straightforward to administer and
produces a relatively conservative estimate of regulatory capital. The IRB approach, which im-
plements ASRF model (4.6), is a more sophisticated method requiring more input data estimated
at higher precision. Its greater complexity makes it more expensive to administer, but usually
produces lower regulatory capital requirements than the standardised approach. As a conse-
quence, ADIs using the IRB approach may deploy their capital in pursuit of more (profitable)
lending opportunities.
In evaluating the robustness of the ASRF model, we conduct an empirical analysis of the Aus-
tralian banking sector. Its findings, though, are pertinent to other banking jurisdictions where
regulatory capital charges are assessed under the IRB approach. In this context we provide back-
ground on the Australian banking sector. Upon implementation of Basel II in the first quarter of
2008, APRA had granted the four largest Australian banks, designated “major” banks, approval
to use the IRB approach to capital adequacy for credit risk. They include: Commonwealth Bank
of Australia (CBA), Westpac Banking Corporation (WBC), National Australia Bank (NAB), and
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ). WBC acquired St. George Bank (SGB) on
1 December 2008, and CBA acquired Bank of Western Australia (BWA) on 19 December 2008.
Putting them in a global context, all four major Australian banks have been ranked in the top
20 banks in the world by market capitalisation, and top 50 by assets, during 2013. We construct
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a portfolio that is representative of credit exposures, reported to APRA by the major banks, for
which regulatory capital is assessed by the ASRF model. We choose the reporting period ending
31 December 2012. At this date, the major banks accounted for 78.1% of total assets on the
balance sheet of ADIs regulated by APRA. Furthermore, of the regulatory capital reported by
the major banks, in aggregate,1 85.5% was assessed for credit risk, 9.4% for operational risk and
5.1% for market risk.2
ADIs lodge their statutory returns with APRA using a secure electronic data submission
system (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 2014). A return is a collection of related
forms covering the same reporting period. A form is a dataset containing information on a spe-
cific topic (e.g., capital, risk class/sub-class, financial statement, etc.). For reference purposes,
forms in spreadsheet format and instructions are available at www.apra.gov.au. Given the
volume of data processed in preparing statutory returns, the major Australian banks automate
their electronic data submissions using XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting Language) — an
XML-based language for preparing, publishing, extracting and exchanging business and finan-
cial information. Once forms are validated and returns submitted, data are stored in APRA’s
data warehouse. We use SQL programming to fetch and aggregate data reported to APRA
by the major banks for the quarter ending 31 December 2012. In particular, we construct the
aforementioned representative credit portfolio on the basis data sourced from IRB credit risk
forms.
Banking book exposures are reported on credit risk forms3 by IRB asset class: corporate (non-
financial), small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME), bank, sovereign, residential mortgages,
retail qualified revolving, and other retail. For presentation purposes we merge IRB asset classes,
1 Data are reported for the major Australian banks, in aggregate, so as not to violate confidentiality agreements.
2 Figures for the quarter ending 31 December 2012, are published by APRA (2013) in its quarterly issue of ADI
performance statistics.
3 Reporting forms and instructions for ADIs available at www.apra.gov.au: ARF_113_1A, ARF_113_1B,
ARF_113_1C, ARF_113_1D, ARF_113_3A, ARF_113_3B, ARF_113_3C, and ARF_113_3D.
Figure 2. EAD and RWA, respectively, of IRB credit exposures of the major
Australian banks at 31 December 2012 are decomposed by sector (business,
government and household).
Source: Australian Prudential Regulation Authority.
Exposure at default by sector
Business (35.8%)
Government (7.8%)
Household (56.4%)
Risk-weighted assets by sector
Business (61.8%)
Government (1.4%)
Household (36.8%)
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and report credit exposures as business, government or household. Henceforth, we refer to
these banking book exposures as IRB credit exposures. Figure 2 decomposes EAD and RWA,
respectively, of IRB credit exposures into business, government and household sectors. At 31
December 2012, RWA for credit risk reported by the major Australian banks, in aggregate, was
divided 72.2/27.8 between IRB credit exposures and other banking book exposures. The market
dominance of the major banks, coupled with the concentration of their regulatory capital held
against unexpected losses on IRB credit exposures, convey the significance of the ASRF model
in protecting the Australian banking sector against insolvency. Accordingly, we contend that,
while focussing exclusively on IRB credit exposures of the major banks, our empirical analysis
draws a representative sample of the credit risk assumed by the Australian banking sector.
Under the IRB approach, ADIs assign their on- and off-balance sheet credit exposures to
internally-defined obligor grades reflecting PD bands, and LGD bands. At 31 December 2012,
RWA of IRB credit exposures held in the banking book of the major Australian banks was
divided 75.0/25.0 between on-balance sheet assets and off-balance sheet exposures. EAD, RWA,
expected loss, and exposure weighted LGD, unconditional PD and firm size are reported for each
obligor grade. We assign IRB credit exposures reported by the major banks to standardised PD
bands (i.e., consistent across the major banks), and calculate risk parameters characterising each
Table 1. Characteristics (EAD and exposure-weighted LGD, unconditional PD
and asset correlation) of a portfolio that is representative of the IRB credit
exposures of the major Australian banks at 31 December 2012 are reported for
each credit rating grade by sector (business, government and household) and for
the whole portfolio.
Credit rating grade
Total AAA AA A BBB BB B Ca
Business EAD, δi ($) 3,552 7 549 1,001 874 728 327 66
LGD, ηi 0.429 0.219 0.519 0.474 0.418 0.356 0.339 0.412
Unconditional PD, pi (%) 1.02 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.41 1.24 3.08 18.56
Asset correlation, ρi 0.198 0.239 0.238 0.231 0.206 0.159 0.112 0.091
Government Exposure at default, δi ($) 785 538 203 18 10 13 3
Loss given default, ηi 0.102 0.088 0.085 0.223 0.496 0.387 0.408
Unconditional PD, pi (%) 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.40 1.74 3.00
Asset correlation, ρi 0.237 0.239 0.238 0.235 0.218 0.171 0.149
Household Exposure at default, δi ($) 5,663 2,581 1,725 919 291 147
Loss given default, ηi 0.244 0.233 0.225 0.264 0.357 0.324
Unconditional PD, pi (%) 0.99 0.08 0.39 1.10 3.68 17.80
Asset correlation, ρi 0.143 0.144 0.147 0.143 0.123 0.127
Portfolio Exposure at default, δi ($) 10,000 545 752 3,600 2,609 1,660 621 213
Loss given default, ηi 0.299 0.090 0.402 0.300 0.291 0.306 0.348 0.350
Unconditional PD, pi (%) 0.93 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.40 1.16 3.36 18.03
Asset correlation, ρi 0.170 0.239 0.238 0.169 0.167 0.150 0.117 0.116
aCCC, CC and C credit ratings.
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of these standardised obligor grades. Asset correlation is constant for residential mortgages and
retail qualified revolving credit exposures; a function of unconditional PD for corporate, bank,
sovereign and other retail credit exposures; and a function of firm size and unconditional PD for
SME credit exposures (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005).
We construct a portfolio that is representative of the IRB credit exposures of the major Aus-
tralian banks at 31 December 2012. That is, exposure weight of each PD band within an IRB
asset class is equal to the corresponding EAD reported by major banks as a percentage of IRB
credit exposures. Credits assigned the same obligor grade share the same risk characteristics:
LGD, unconditional PD and asset correlation. Table 1 categorises credit exposures as business,
government or household, and groups them into credit rating grades on the basis of obligors’
unconditional PD.4 It reports EAD, and exposure weighted LGD, unconditional PD and asset
correlation for each credit rating grade by sector. Sections 6 and 7, respectively, use character-
istics of this representative credit portfolio to measure the rate of convergence to the asymptotic
portfolio loss distribution, and evaluate the sensitivity of credit risk capital to dependence struc-
ture as modelled by asset correlations and elliptical copulas.
6. Rate of Convergence to the Asymptotic Distribution
The Basel II IRB approach to credit risk is premised on Proposition 2.19. Assuming a con-
ditional independence model of an asymptotic credit portfolio, it asserts that quantiles of the
distribution of conditional expectation of portfolio percentage loss may be substituted for quan-
tiles of the portfolio loss distribution. Before measuring the rate of convergence to the asymptotic
portfolio loss distribution, we demonstrate that Proposition 2.19 holds for a representative credit
portfolio within a static (i.e., single-period) framework. Table 1 describes the representative
credit portfolio. In order to construct a portfolio that exhibits sufficient granularity we impose
the constraint that no credit accounts for more than one basis point exposure. This exercise
demonstrates that the α quantile of the distribution of E[Ln |Y ], which is associated with the
(1−α) quantile of the distribution of Y , may be substituted for the α quantile of the distribu-
tion of Ln. Firstly, capital held against unexpected losses at the 99.9% confidence level over a
one-year horizon, K˜99.9%(Ln), is calculated analytically by ASRF model (4.6). The expectation
of portfolio percentage loss over a one-year horizon conditional on a state of the economy that is
worse than at most 99.9% of economic scenarios, E
[
Ln |Y = Φ−1(0.001)
]
, is readily calculated by
the first term on the right-hand side of (4.6). Expected loss, E[Ln], is given by the second term of
the right-hand side of (4.6). And K˜99.9%(Ln) is the difference between E
[
Ln |Y = Φ−1(0.001)
]
and E[Ln].
Next, K99.9%(Ln) is determined by computationally intensive simulation (2.26). Credit VaR
at the 99.9% confidence level over a one-year horizon, VaR99.9%(Ln), is determined from the
empirical loss distribution of the representative credit portfolio, which is generated by simulation
of (2.10) parameterised by (2.6).5 Monte Carlo simulation performs 1,000,000 iterations to
generate the empirical loss distribution (Figure 3). Equation (2.26) calculates the portfolio
percentage loss for each iteration, and credit VaR is the 99.9% quantile of the empirical loss
distribution described by (2.27). Expected loss, E[Ln], is given by (2.28). And K99.9%(Ln) is
the difference between VaR99.9%(Ln) and E[Ln].
It remains to compare the estimates produced by the analytical and simulation models. Given
that this representative portfolio contains a large number of credits without concentration in a
4 We use the mapping of S&P credit rating grades to KMV expected default frequency values derived by Lopez
(2002).
5 Gaussian random variables are generated using GNU Scientific Library routine gsl_ran_gaussian. It implements
the Box-Muller algorithm, which make two calls to the MT19937 generator of Makoto Matsumoto and Takuji
Nishimura.
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Figure 3. The empirical loss distribution of the representative credit portfolio
described in Table 1 is generated by Monte Carlo simulation. The portfolio is
constructed such that no credit accounts for more than one basis point exposure,
and credit losses are reported as a percentage of EAD.
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Table 2. Capital charges, at the 99.9% confidence level over a one-year horizon,
assessed on the representative credit portfolio described in Table 1. The port-
folio is constructed such that no credit accounts for more than one basis point
exposure. Credit VaR at the 99.9% confidence level is computed numerically by
Monte Carlo simulation, and its analytical approximation is calculated by the
ASRF model.
% of EAD
ASRF Simulation
E
[
Ln |Y = Φ−1(0.001)
]
2.18 2.19 VaR99.9%(Ln)
E[Ln] 0.31 0.31 E[Ln]
K˜99.9%(Ln) 1.87 1.88 K99.9%(Ln)
few names dominating the rest of the portfolio, we anticipate that as the number of simulation
iterations increases, its empirical loss distribution will converge to the distribution of conditional
expectation of portfolio percentage loss. Confirming our intuition, Table 2 reports that estimates
from the ASRF model and Monte Carlo simulation are within one basis point of one another.
Recall that ASRF model (4.6) describes defaults as conditionally independent Gaussian random
variables, and the Monte Carlo simulation of (2.10), parameterised by (2.6), draws random
variables representing the single systematic risk factor and obligor specific risks from a Gaussian
distribution. So, it would be surprising if this convergence did not occur. Indeed, for a number
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of iterations large enough and a portfolio exhibiting sufficient granularity, the simulation does
little more than demonstrate that the expectation of indicator function 1{Zi<ζi(y)} is conditional
PD pi(y). Our findings provide empirical support for Proposition 2.19.
Evidently, the representative credit portfolio described in Table 1, with no credit accounting
for more that one basis point exposure, adequately satisfies the asymptotic granularity condi-
tion of Definition 2.6, an assumption of Proposition 2.19. But how large need the number of
credits, or obligors, constituting a portfolio be for E[Ln |Y = Φ−1(1−α)] to produce a statis-
tically accurate estimate of VaRα(Ln)? We proceed to address this question by constructing
portfolios comprising obligors ranging in number from 50 to 2000. For each portfolio we assign
its constituent obligors equal dollar EAD, and exposure weighted LGD, unconditional PD and
asset correlation as calculated for exposures to the business sector of the representative credit
portfolio described in Table 1. We choose to conduct this exercise on portfolios representative
of IRB credit exposures of the major banks to the business sector, because corporate loans are
typically “lumpier” than residential mortgages.
We generate empirical loss distributions, one for each of the constituted portfolios containing a
finite number of obligors, by simulation of (2.10) parameterised by (2.6). Monte Carlo simulation
performs 1,000,000 iterations to generate an empirical loss distribution for each of the constituted
portfolios. The distribution of conditional expectation of portfolio percentage loss represents the
loss distribution of an infinitely fine-grained portfolio. Solvency assessment is concerned with
Figure 4. Credit VaR at the α confidence level, 99.0% ≤ α < 100.0%, for port-
folios comprising obligors ranging in number from 50 to 2000. The portfolios
are representative of IRB credit exposures of the major Australian banks to the
business sector reported in Table 1. The curves illustrate the rate of conver-
gence in the tail of empirical loss distributions, VaRα(Ln), to the distribution
of conditional expectation of portfolio percentage loss, E[Ln |Y = Φ−1(1−α)],
representing the loss distribution of an infinitely fine-grained portfolio.
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the tail of the portfolio loss distribution, so we examine the confidence interval bounded by
99.0% ≤ α < 100.0%. VaRα(Ln) for each of the constituted portfolios is the α quantile of the
empirical loss distributions described by (2.27). E[Ln |Y = Φ−1(1−α)] is given by the first term
on the right-hand side of ASRF model (4.5). Figure 4 plots the tail of each of the empirical
loss distributions along with the tail of the distribution of conditional expectation of portfolio
percentage loss, illustrating the rate of convergence in terms of number of obligors. By inspection
we argue that a statistically accurate estimate of VaRα(Ln) is given by E[Ln |Y = Φ−1(1−α)] for
portfolios comprising 1,000 obligors or more, without concentration in a few names dominating
the rest of the portfolio.
7. Sensitivity of Credit Risk Capital to Dependence Structure
Regulatory capital models, which serve the sole purpose of solvency assessment, require pre-
cision in the measurement of absolute risk levels under stressed economic conditions. In this
section we evaluate the robustness of the model specification of the Basel II IRB approach to
a relaxation of model assumptions. Firstly, in relation to the one-factor Gaussian copula, we
evaluate the sensitivity of credit risk capital to dependence structure as described by asset corre-
lations. Then, we examine the effect of tail dependence by measuring the sensitivity of credit risk
capital to dependence structure, as modelled by a variety of elliptical copulas. As in Section 6,
we conduct this empirical analysis on a portfolio, with characteristics described in Table 1, that
is representative of the IRB credit exposures of the major banks at 31 December 2012.
7.1. Default Dependence Described by Asset Correlations. The IRB approach, in effect,
applies the one-factor Gaussian copula of Corollary 3.3 with matrix (3.9) describing pairwise
correlations between obligors’ asset values. Choosing the one-factor Gaussian copula to model
default dependence, we evaluate the sensitivity of credit risk capital to dependence structure as
described by asset correlations.
Recall from Section 5 that the IRB approach models asset correlation as a constant for resi-
dential mortgages and retail qualified revolving credit exposures; a function of unconditional
PD for corporate, bank, sovereign and other retail credit exposures; and a function of firm size
and unconditional PD for SME credit exposures. Parameters of the asset correlation functions
prescribed by the IRB approach were derived from an analysis of times series collected by G10
supervisors. Even if the dependence described by parameters derived from this time series analy-
sis continues to hold, the actual asset correlation will lie in some distribution around the estimate
given by the model specification of the IRB approach. So, some measure of the sensitivity of
credit risk capital to the error in asset correlation estimates would be informative.
Figure 5 plots the sensitivity of E
[
Ln |Y = Φ−1(1−α)
]
, and hence credit risk capital, to
dependence structure as described by asset correlations. Here, we adopt the credit risk capital
interpretation of Definition 4.4, which applies to portfolios that adequately satisfy the asymptotic
granularity condition of Definition 2.6. E
[
Ln |Y = Φ−1(1−α)
]
, given by the first term on the
right-hand side of (4.5), is calculated for the representative credit portfolio described in Table 1,
and then recalculated after adjusting the asset correlation assigned to constituent obligors by
±10% and ±20%. Since solvency assessment is concerned with the tail of the portfolio loss
distribution, we examine the confidence interval bounded by 90.0% ≤ α < 100.0%. Conditional
expectation of portfolio percentage loss becomes more sensitive to asset correlation as one moves
further into the tail of the portfolio loss distribution. At the 99.9% confidence level the rela-
tive error in asset correlation estimates affects the calculation of credit risk capital by a similar
magnitude. Naturally, this heuristic for the sensitivity of credit risk capital to asset correlation
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Figure 5. E
[
Ln |Y = Φ−1(1−α)
]
, 90.0% ≤ α < 100.0%, for the representative
credit portfolio described in Table 1. The sensitivity of E
[
Ln |Y = Φ−1(1−α)
]
to default dependence structure is measured by adjusting the asset correlation
assigned to constituent obligors by ±10% and ±20%.
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only applies deep in the tail of the loss distribution of near asymptotic portfolios with character-
istics (viz., unconditional PDs and asset correlations) not very different from those described in
Table 1.
7.2. Dependence Structure Modelled by Elliptical Copulas. While it’s generally acknowl-
edged that models which assume that financial data follow a Gaussian distribution tend to under-
estimate tail risk, the IRB approach to solvency assessment does apply the one-factor Gaussian
copula. As discussed in Section 3.3, Gaussian copulas do not exhibit tail dependence — the
tendency for extreme observations (i.e., credit defaults) to occur simultaneously for all random
variables. We examine the effect of tail dependence by measuring the sensitivity of credit risk cap-
ital to dependence structure as modelled by elliptical copulas, including Gaussian and Student’s t
copulas. The latter, which we abbreviate by t-copula, admits tail dependence with fewer degrees
of freedom producing stronger dependence (Figure 1).
In order to evaluate the sensitivity of credit risk capital to default dependence structure, we
generate empirical loss distributions of the representative credit portfolio described in Table 1
using elliptical copulas: one-factor Gaussian copula, and t-copulas with 30, 10 and 3 degrees of
freedom and Gaussian margins. Again, the portfolio is constructed such that no credit accounts
for more than one basis point exposure. Assuming that asset values follow a log-normal distri-
bution, distributional differences are attributed to the copula function modelling default depen-
dence. The one-factor Gaussian copula is implemented by simulation of (2.10) parameterised by
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Figure 6. VaRα(Ln), 90.0% ≤ α < 100.0%, for the representative credit port-
folio described in Table 1. The portfolio is constructed such that no credit
accounts for more than one basis point exposure. The sensitivity of VaRα(Ln) to
default dependence structure is measured by generating empirical loss distribu-
tions using elliptical copulas and assuming that asset values follow a log-normal
distribution.
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(2.6), and generates the empirical loss distribution plotted in Figure 3. t-copulas with Gauss-
ian margins are implemented by simulation of (3.17) parameterised by (3.16).6 Monte Carlo
simulation performs 1,000,000 iterations.
Figure 6 plots the sensitivity of credit VaR, and hence credit risk capital, to default dependence
structure as modelled by the one-factor Gaussian copula and t-copulas with Gaussian margins.
As in Section 7.1, we examine the confidence interval bounded by 90.0% ≤ α < 100.0%. At
the 90.0% confidence level there is little difference in estimates of credit VaR computed by the
respective elliptical copulas. However, as one moves further into the tail of the empirical loss
distribution estimates of credit VaR diverge at an accelerating rate. At the 99.9% confidence
level credit VaR computed by the t-copula with ν = 10 is more than double that computed by the
Gaussian copula; and the t-copula with ν = 3 estimates credit VaR to be more than four times the
estimate produced by the Gaussian copula. Unfortunately, the calibration of degrees of freedom
is not easy and to some extent subjective, which may explain why the one-factor Gaussian copula
prevails in practice. The sensitivity of credit risk capital to the choice of elliptical copula can be
much greater than its sensitivity to asset correlation.
6 Normally and chi-square distributed random variables are generated using GNU Scientific Library routines
gsl_ran_gaussian and gsl_ran_chisq, respectively.
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8. Conclusion
The academic contribution of this paper is both theoretical and empirical. We derive the
theoretical foundations of the IRB approach to capital adequacy for credit risk. Adapting the
single asset model of Merton (1974) to a portfolio of credits, Vasicek (2002) derived a function
that transforms unconditional PDs into PDs conditional on a single systematic risk factor. It
is the kernel of ASRF model prescribed by the IRB approach. The ASRF model rests on the
proposition, due to Gordy (2003), that quantiles of the distribution of conditional expectation
of portfolio percentage loss may be substituted for quantiles of the portfolio loss distribution.
Here, our theoretical contribution is to present a more compact proof of this proposition starting
from weaker assumptions, and extend the ASRF model to a more general setting than the usual
Gaussian case.
We proceed to conduct an empirical analysis of the ASRF model using internal bank data
collected by the prudential regulator. Access to these data distinguishes our research from other
empirical studies on the IRB approach. Firstly, we demonstrate that Gordy’s proposition holds
for a portfolio that is representative of the IRB credit exposures of the major Australian banks,
and exhibits sufficient granularity. Quantiles of the distribution of conditional expectation of
portfolio percentage loss are readily calculated by the analytical ASRF model, while quantiles of
the portfolio loss distribution are determined by a computationally intensive simulation of the
Gaussian conditional independence model. For our representative portfolio, estimates of credit
risk capital from the ASRF model and Monte Carlo simulation are within one basis point of one
another. Then, we measure the rate of convergence, in terms of number of obligors, of empirical
loss distributions to the asymptotic portfolio loss distribution (i.e., the distribution of condi-
tional expectation of portfolio percentage loss representing an infinitely fine-grained portfolio).
For portfolios comprising 1,000 obligors or more, without concentration in a few names domi-
nating the rest of the portfolio, the conditional expectation of portfolio percentage loss provides
a statistically accurate estimate of portfolio percentage loss in the tail of the portfolio loss distri-
bution. Assuming that a Gaussian conditional independence model accurately describes default
dependence and credit portfolios exhibit sufficient granularity, we find empirical support for the
IRB approach.
In the context of solvency assessment, we empirically evaluate the sensitivity of credit risk
capital (in the tail of the portfolio loss distribution) to dependence structure. The IRB approach
applies the one-factor Gaussian copula with default dependence described by the matrix of pair-
wise correlations between obligors’ asset values. The relative error in asset correlation estimates
affects the calculation of credit risk capital by a similar magnitude. Assuming that asset values
follow a log-normal distribution, the portfolio loss distribution is determined by the copula func-
tion chosen to combine its margins. The sensitivity of credit risk capital to dependence structure
as modelled by elliptical copulas, including Gaussian and Student’s t copulas, can be much
greater than its sensitivity to asset correlations.
A couple of future research directions emerge from this paper. In a related research paper
Rutkowski and Tarca (2014) take measurements from the ASRF model of the prevailing state
of Australia’s economy and the level of capitalisation of its banking sector. They find general
agreement with macroeconomic indicators, financial statistics and external credit ratings. Given
the range of economic conditions, from mild contraction to moderate expansion, experienced
in Australia since the implementation of Basel II, their empirical findings support a favourable
assessment of the ASRF model for purposes of capital allocation, performance attribution and
risk monitoring. Evaluating the ASRF model for the purpose of solvency assessment, would
involve taking readings from north Atlantic banking jurisdictions that experienced the full force
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of the financial crisis of 2007–09, which precipitated the worst global recession since the Great
Depression of the 1930s.
Portfolios of large banks contain financial instruments that are influenced by a multitude of
underlying risk factors. Internal and external risk controllers, such as the prudential regulator,
require risks to be measured over varying holding periods for different risk classes (e.g., one-day or
10-day for market risk, and one-year for credit and operational risks). The path dependent nature
of many risks and the requirement to measure portfolio risk over different time horizons leads to
a multi-period, or dynamic, simulation. It is practical then to simulate all variables, including
defaults and survivals, in each time period. In order to consistently represent dependence between
multivariate default times in each period of the simulation, Brigo et al. (2013) model default
times using a continuous-time Markov chain with multivariate exponential distribution (i.e.,
Marshall-Olkin copula). An efficient implementation of this Markovian credit risk model remains
a challenge in building a feasible multi-period simulation for measuring risk in massive portfolios.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 2.9
Gordy (2003, Proposition 1) established that, conditional on a single systematic risk factor, the
portfolio percentage loss converges, almost surely, to its conditional expectation as the portfolio
approaches asymptotic granularity.
Proposition 2.9. Assume a conditional independence model of an asymptotic credit portfolio.
Then,
lim
n→∞
(
Ln −
n∑
i=1
wiηipi(Y )
)
= 0, P-a.s. (2.20)
Proof. It relies on a variant of the strong law of large numbers (see, e.g., Grimmett and Stirzaker,
2001, Theorem 7.5.1) based on Kolmogorov’s convergence criterion and Kronecker’s lemma.
For a credit portfolio comprising n obligors, wi = δi/∆n is the exposure weight of obligor i.
Firstly, observe that given realisation y ∈ R of systematic risk factor Y , conditional variances
satisfy
∞∑
i=1
Var
(
δiηi1{Zi<ζi(y)}
∆i
)
=
∞∑
i=1
(
δi
∆i
)2
η2i pi(y)(1− pi(y)) ≤
∞∑
i=1
(
δi
∆i
)2
<∞,
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where Var
(
1{Zi<ζi(y)}
)
= pi(y)(1− pi(y)). Recall that E
[
1{Zi<ζi(y)}
]
= pi(y), and the sequence
of random variables {δkηk1{Zk<ζk(y)}/∆k} is independent with respect to Py. Then,
∞∑
i=1
δiηi
∆i
(
1{Zi<ζi(y)} − pi(y)
)
(A.1)
converges Py-almost surely by Kolmogorov’s convergence criterion (Gut, 2005, Theorem 6.5.2).
Notice that {δkηk(1{Zk<ζk(y)} − pk(y))} constitutes a sequence of random variables, and the
sequence of real numbers {∆k} is positive and strictly increasing to infinity. Next, applying
Kronecker’s lemma (Gut, 2005, Lemma 6.5.1) to infinite series (A.1) yields
1
∆n
n∑
i=1
δiηi
(
1{Zi<ζi(y)} − pi(y)
) a.s.−→ 0 as n→∞,
which implies that
lim
n→∞
(
Ln −
n∑
i=1
wiηipi(y)
)
= 0,
Py-almost surely for all y ∈ R. Accordingly, (2.20) holds P-almost surely. 
Appendix B. Proof of Corollary 2.15
We generalise the Vasicek (2002) formulation of the loss distribution function of an asymptotic,
homogeneous portfolio, which models default dependence as a multivariate Gaussian process.
Corollary 2.15. Assume a conditional independence model of an asymptotic, homogeneous
credit portfolio. Then,
lim
n→∞
Ln = ηp(Y ), P-a.s. (2.21)
Accordingly, the portfolio loss distribution satisfies
lim
n→∞
P(Ln ≤ l) = 1−H
(
F−1(p)−√1− γ2G−1(l/η)
γ
)
(2.22)
for all l ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. For the homogeneous case of Definition 2.13, let
ζ(y) =
F−1(p)− γy√
1− γ2 = G
−1
(
p(y)
)
.
Then, conditional on realisation y ∈ R of systematic risk factor Y , the portfolio percentage loss
is calculated as
Ln =
n∑
i=1
wiη1{Zi<ζ(y)}, (B.1)
where 1{Zi<ζ(y)} are independent identically distributed Bernoulli random variables with finite
mean and variance. By the strong law of large numbers (see, e.g., Grimmett and Stirzaker, 2001,
Theorem 7.5.1), 1{Zi<ζ(y)} converges to its conditional expectation p(y) as n → ∞, Py-almost
surely for all y ∈ R. Observing that ∑ni=1 wi = 1 for all n ∈ N, and η ∈ [0, 1], (2.21) holds
P-almost surely.
It follows from (2.21) that given Y = y,
lim
n→∞
Ln = ηp(y),
which is a deterministic quantity. Hence,
lim
n→∞
P(Ln ≤ l |Y = y) = 1{0<ηp(y)≤l} = 1{p−1(l/η)≤y<∞}.
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Then, integrating over systematic risk factor Y with density function h(y), yields the limiting
form of the portfolio loss distribution:
lim
n→∞
P(Ln ≤ l) = lim
n→∞
∫ ∞
−∞
P(Ln ≤ l, Y = y) dy = lim
n→∞
∫ ∞
−∞
P(Ln ≤ l |Y = y)h(y) dy
=
∫ ∞
−∞
lim
n→∞
P(Ln ≤ l |Y = y)h(y) dy =
∫ ∞
−∞
1{p−1(l/η)≤y<∞}h(y) dy
=
∫ ∞
p−1(l/η)
h(y) dy = 1−
∫ p−1(l/η)
−∞
h(y) dy
= 1−H (p−1(l/η)) = 1−H (F−1(p)−√1− γ2G−1(l/η)
γ
)
.
The dominated convergence theorem (see, e.g., Shreve, 2004, Theorem 1.4.9) provides conditions
under which the limit of integrals of a sequence of functions is the integral of the limiting function.
It justifies the third equality, while the last equality follows from (2.13). 
Appendix C. Proposition due to Gordy (2003)
The Basel II IRB approach rests on Proposition 5 of Gordy (2003) that quantiles of the dis-
tribution of conditional expectation of portfolio percentage loss may be substituted for quantiles
of the portfolio loss distribution. It leads to an analytical approximation of credit VaR. In
Section 2.5 we present a version of this proposition that relaxes the technical conditions imposed
by Gordy, resulting in a more compact, or parsimonious, proof. Here, the statement and proof
of Proposition C.1 closely follow that of Gordy (2003).
Proposition C.1. Consider a credit portfolio comprising n obligors, and denote by Ln the
portfolio percentage loss. Let Y be a random variable with continuous and strictly increasing
distribution function H, and denote by ϕn(Y ) the conditional expectation of portfolio percentage
loss E[Ln |Y ]. Assume that the following conditions hold:
(1) lim
n→∞
(
Ln −
n∑
i=1
ϕn(Y )
)
= 0, P-a.s.
(2) There is an open interval I containing H−1(1−α), α ∈ (0, 1), and N0 ∈ N such that when-
ever n > N0 the conditional expectation of portfolio percentage loss, ϕn(y) = E[Ln |Y = y],
is strictly decreasing in y and differentiable on I.
(3) There is an N0 ∈ N such that whenever n > N0,
−∞ < −Θ ≤ ϕ′n(y) ≤ −θ < 0 (C.1)
for all y ∈ I, with θ > 0 and Θ > 0 independent of n, and where ϕ′n(y) denotes the
derivative of E[Ln |Y = y] with respect to y.
Then,
lim
n→∞
P
(
Ln ≤ ϕn
(
H−1(1−α))) = α, (C.2)
and
lim
n→∞
∣∣VaRα(Ln)− ϕn(H−1(1−α))∣∣ = 0. (C.3)
Remark C.2. Proposition C.1 applies more generally than to the conditional independence model
of Definition 2.2. However, we are not aware of competing models for which the conditional
expectation function ϕn satisfies Condition (1).
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Remark C.3. Condition (1) of Proposition C.1 postulates that portfolio percentage loss converges,
almost surely, to its conditional expectation as the portfolio approaches asymptotic granularity.
The proof of Proposition C.1 only requires convergence in probability, but we assume almost sure
convergence consistent with Proposition 2.9. For an asymptotic credit portfolio (Definition 2.6),
the conditional independence model of Definition 2.2 satisfies Condition (1) by Proposition 2.9.
Conditions (2) and (3) are more technical in nature. Condition (2) postulates that the condi-
tional expectation of portfolio percentage loss rises “smoothly” as the economy deteriorates for
a set of states of the economy associated with the tail of the portfolio loss distribution, which
is the concern of solvency assessment. In relation to the conditional independence model of
Definition 2.2, we quite reasonably assume that the conditional expectation function ϕn satisfies
Condition (2). By inspection of (2.12) we observe that Condition (3) holds if pi and γ
2
i are
bounded away from zero and one for i = 1, . . . , n.
The proof of Proposition C.1, presented below, requires a result due to Petrov (1995), which
we proceed to state. Note that in Lemma C.4, variables X and Z and functions F and G denote
arbitrary random variables and distribution functions, and in Proposition C.1, Fn and Gn denote
distribution functions distinct from the notation adopted in Section 2.2.
Lemma C.4. Let X and Z be random variables defined on a common probability space with
distribution functions F and G, respectively. For all a ∈ R and ε > 0,∣∣F (a)−G(a)∣∣ ≤ P(|X − Z| > ε)+max {G(a+ε)−G(a), G(a) −G(a−ε)} . (C.4)
Proof. See Petrov (1995, Lemma 1.8). 
Proof of Proposition C.1. Denote by Fn and Gn the distribution functions of Ln and ϕn(Y ),
respectively. Firstly, by appealing to Lemma C.4, we show that∣∣Fn(ϕn(y))−Gn(ϕn(y))∣∣→ 0 as n→∞,
for all y ∈ I, and deduce (C.2). Set X = Ln, Z = ϕn(Y ) and a = ϕn(y) in Lemma C.4. Then,
for any ε > 0,∣∣Fn(ϕn(y))−Gn(ϕn(y))∣∣
≤ P(∣∣Ln − ϕn(Y )∣∣ > ε)
+ max
{
Gn
(
ϕn(y) + ε
)−Gn(ϕn(y)), Gn(ϕn(y))−Gn(ϕn(y)− ε)} . (C.5)
The almost sure convergence asserted by Condition (1) implies convergence in probability
(Grimmett and Stirzaker, 2001, Theorem 7.2.3). By the definition of convergence in probability
(Grimmett and Stirzaker, 2001, Definition 7.2.1), for any ξ > 0 and ε > 0, choose an N1 ∈ N
(which in general depends on ε and ξ) such that n > N1 implies
P
(∣∣Ln − E[Ln |Y ]∣∣ > ε) < ξ
2
(C.6)
for all y ∈ I.
The convergence of Gn in the neighbourhood of ϕn
(
H−1(1−α)) does not immediately follow
from the assumption that ϕn(y) is differentiable on I. By hypothesis, ϕn(y) is differentiable
on I and ϕ′n(y) has an upper bound −θ on I whenever n > N0. By the mean value theorem
(see, e.g., Wade, 2004, Theorem 4.15), for any ε > 0 satisfying (y − ε/θ, y + ε/θ) ⊂ I, there is a
y∗ ∈ (y − ε/θ, y) such that
ϕn(y − ε/θ)− ϕn(y) = ϕ′n(y∗)(−ε/θ) ≥ −θ(−ε/θ) = ε
for n > N0. Similarly, there is a y
∗ ∈ (y, y + ε/θ) such that
ϕn(y)− ϕn(y + ε/θ) = ϕ′n(y∗)(−ε/θ) ≥ −θ(−ε/θ) = ε
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for n > N0. By hypothesis, ϕn(y) is strictly decreasing in y on I whenever n > N0, implying
that ϕn(Y ) ≤ ϕn(y) if and only if Y ≥ y. Moreover, H is continuous and strictly increasing.
Accordingly,
Gn
(
ϕn(y)
)
= P(Y ≥ y) = 1−H(y). (C.7)
Hence,
Gn
(
ϕn(y) + ε
) ≤ Gn(ϕn(y − ε/θ)) = P(Y ≥ y − ε/θ)
and
Gn
(
ϕn(y)− ε
) ≥ Gn(ϕn(y + ε/θ)) = P(Y ≥ y + ε/θ)
for n > N0. It follows that the continuity of H(y) on I implies convergence. That is, for any
ξ > 0 and ε > 0, there is an N0 ∈ N (which in general depends on ε and ξ) such that n > N0
implies
max
{
Gn
(
ϕn(y) + ε
)−Gn(ϕn(y)), Gn(ϕn(y))−Gn(ϕn(y)− ε)}
≤ max {P(Y ≥ y − ε/θ)− P(Y ≥ y),P(Y ≥ y)− P(Y ≥ y + ε/θ)}
= max {H(y)−H(y − ε/θ), H(y + ε/θ)−H(y)} < ξ
2
(C.8)
for any y ∈ I. Combining (C.6) and (C.8) to evaluate (C.5), we claim that for any ξ > 0,
whenever n > N = max{N0, N1},∣∣Fn(ϕn(y))−Gn(ϕn(y))∣∣ = ∣∣P(Ln ≤ ϕn(y))− P(ϕn(Y ) ≤ ϕn(y))∣∣ < ξ
2
+
ξ
2
= ξ (C.9)
for any y ∈ I. Substituting for Gn
(
ϕn(y)
)
in (C.9) from (C.7), and setting y = H−1(1−α) ∈ I,
(C.9) may be expressed as
lim
n→∞
∣∣P (Ln ≤ ϕn(H−1(1−α)))− P(Y ≥ H−1(1−α))∣∣ = 0. (C.10)
Now, observing that P
(
Y ≥ H−1(1−α)) = α establishes (C.2), and completes the first part of
the proof.
It remains to deduce (C.3). Notice that whenever n > N , (y−ε/Θ, y+ε/Θ) ⊆ (y−ε/θ, y+ε/θ)
and ϕ′n(y) has a lower bound−Θ on I. Again, by the mean value theorem, for any ε > 0 satisfying
(y − ε/Θ, y + ε/Θ) ⊂ I, there is a y∗ ∈ (y − ε/Θ, y) such that
ϕn(y − ε/Θ)− ϕn(y) = ϕ′n(y∗)(−ε/Θ) ≤ −Θ(−ε/Θ) = ε
for n > N . Similarly, there is a y∗ ∈ (y, y + ε/Θ) such that
ϕn(y)− ϕn(y + ε/Θ) = ϕ′n(y∗)(−ε/Θ) ≤ −Θ(−ε/Θ) = ε
for n > N . Setting y = H−1(1−α) ∈ I, corresponding to the α confidence level in Definition 2.18,
yields
Fn
(
ϕn(H
−1(1−α)) + ε) ≥ Fn(ϕn(H−1(1−α)− ε/Θ))
= Gn
(
ϕn(H
−1(1−α)− ε/Θ))
= P
(
Y ≥ H−1(1−α)− ε/Θ)
> α. (C.11)
The first equality is a consequence of (C.10), the second of (C.7). It follows from Definition 2.18
and (C.11) that whenever n > N ,
VaRα(Ln) < ϕn
(
H−1(1−α))+ ε. (C.12)
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By a parallel argument, whenever n > N ,
Fn
(
ϕn(H
−1(1−α))− ε) ≤ Fn(ϕn(H−1(1−α) + ε/Θ))
= Gn
(
ϕn(H
−1(1−α) + ε/Θ))
= P
(
Y ≥ H−1(1−α) + ε/Θ)
< α, (C.13)
and
VaRα(Ln) > ϕn
(
H−1(1−α))− ε. (C.14)
Together, (C.12) and (C.14) may be expressed as∣∣VaRα(Ln)− ϕn(H−1(1−α))∣∣ < ε.
Setting ε arbitrarily close to zero establishes (C.3), and completes the proof. 
Appendix D. Proof of Lemma 3.1 and Corollary 3.3
Lemma 3.1 derives the single-factor copula model describing default dependence for the general
case. Then, Corollary 3.3 deals with the special case of the one-factor Gaussian copula, the most
commonly applied copula function in credit risk modelling.
Lemma 3.1. Assume a conditional independence model of a credit portfolio comprising n obligors.
Then, default dependence may be described by the single-factor copula function associated with
(W1, . . . ,Wn):
C(u1, . . . , un) =
∫ ∞
−∞
(
n∏
i=1
Gi
(
F−1i (ui)− γiy√
1− γ2i
))
dH(y) (3.5)
for any (u1, . . . , un) ∈ [0, 1]n.
Proof. Integrating conditional marginal distribution functions over systematic risk factor Y ,
copula (3.4) may be expressed as
C(u1, . . . , un) = P
(
W1 < F
−1
1 (u1), . . . ,Wn < F
−1
n (un)
)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
P
(
W1 < F
−1
1 (u1), . . . ,Wn < F
−1
n (un) |Y = y
)
dH(y)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
P
(
W1 < F
−1
1 (u1) |Y = y
)
. . .P
(
Wn < F
−1
n (un) |Y = y
)
dH(y).
(D.1)
The integrand in the last equality is the product of obligor PDs conditional on realisation y ∈ R
of systematic risk factor Y . Substituting the probability statements in this integrand with the
expression for conditional PD in (2.12), and observing that ui = pi for i = 1, . . . , n estab-
lishes (3.5). 
Corollary 3.3. Assume a Gaussian conditional independence model of a credit portfolio compris-
ing n obligors with pairwise asset correlations defined by matrix (3.9). Then, default dependence
may be described by the one-factor Gaussian copula associated with (W1, . . . ,Wn):
CΓ̂(u1, . . . , un) = ΦΓ̂
(
Φ−1(u1), . . . ,Φ
−1(un)
)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
(
n∏
i=1
Φ
(
Φ−1(ui)−√ρi y√
1− ρi
))
φ(y) dy (3.10)
for any (u1, . . . , un) ∈ [0, 1]n.
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Proof. Substituting the operands of the product operator in (3.5) with the expression for condi-
tional PD in (2.5), and observing that dΦ(y) = φ(y) dy establishes (3.10). 
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 4.3
Appealing to Definition 4.1 and Proposition 2.19, we deduce a function for calculating capital
held against unexpected losses, Kα(Ln).
Proposition 4.3. Assume a conditional independence model of an asymptotic credit portfolio.
Then,
lim
n→∞
Kα(Ln) = lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
wiηiGi
(
F−1i (pi)− γiH−1(1−α)√
1− γ2i
)
− lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
wiηipi, (4.2)
assuming that the limits on the right-hand side of (4.2) are well defined.
Proof. By Definition 4.2, capital held against unexpected losses on an asymptotic credit portfolio
may be expressed as
lim
n→∞
Kα(Ln) = lim
n→∞
VaRα(Ln)− lim
n→∞
E[Ln], (E.1)
assuming that the limits on the right-hand side are well defined. By hypothesis, defaults are
modelled as conditionally independent random variables given systematic risk factor Y . So,
adding and subtracting the α quantile of the distribution of conditional expectation of portfolio
percentage loss yields
lim
n→∞
Kα(Ln) = lim
n→∞
(
VaRα(Ln)− E
[
Ln |Y = H−1(1−α)
])
+ lim
n→∞
E
[
Ln |Y = H−1(1−α)
]− lim
n→∞
E[Ln]
= lim
n→∞
E
[
Ln |Y = H−1(1−α)
]− lim
n→∞
E[Ln], (E.2)
where the limits on the right-hand side of (E.2) are well defined by hypothesis. Recall that in
probabilistic terms, VaRα(Ln) is the α quantile of the portfolio loss distribution, qα(Ln). Hence,
the second equality in (E.2) follows from Proposition 2.19, with the α quantile of the distribution
of E[Ln |Y ], in effect, being substituted for VaRα(Ln). Expanding (E.2) using (2.15) and (2.16)
yields
lim
n→∞
Kα(Ln) = lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
wiηipi
(
H−1(1−α))− lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
wiηipi. (E.3)
Finally, setting y = H−1(1−α) in (2.12) and substituting into (E.3) establishes (4.2). 
References
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2008). Capital adequacy: Internal ratings-based approach
to credit risk. ADI Prudential Standard 113. http://apra.gov.au/adi/PrudentialFramework.
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2013). Quarterly authorised deposit-taking institution
performance. Statistics. http://apra.gov.au/adi/Publications.
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2014, June). D2A guide for APRA regulated institutions.
Help guide. http://www.apra.gov.au/CrossIndustry/Pages/D2A.aspx.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005, July). An explanatory note on the
Basel II IRB risk weight functions. Information paper, Bank for International Settlements.
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/irbriskweight.htm.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006, June). Basel II: International convergence of capi-
tal measurement and capital standards. Standards, Bank for International Settlements. A revised
framework, comprehensive version.
This article is c© World Scientific Publishing and permission has been granted for this version
to appear on www.arxiv.org. World Scientific does not grant permission for this article to
be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from World
Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
REGULATORY CAPITAL MODELLING FOR CREDIT RISK 35
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Organisation of Securities Commis-
sions, and International Association of Insurance Supervisors (2010, October). Develop-
ments in modelling risk aggregation. Joint Forum 25, Bank for International Settlements.
http://www.bis.org/publ/joint25.htm.
Bluhm, C., L. Overbeck, and C. Wagner (2010). Introduction to Credit Risk Modeling (2nd ed.). Boca
Raton, FL: Chapman & Hall / CRC.
Brigo, D., J.-F. Mai, and M. Scherer (2013). Consistent iterated simulation of multi-variate default
times: A markovian indicators characterization. arXiv: 1306.0887 [q-fin.RM].
Embrechts, P., F. Lindskog, and A. J. McNeil (2003). Modelling dependence with copulas and applica-
tions to risk management. In S. T. Rachev (Ed.), Handbook of Heavy Tailed Distributions in Finance,
Chapter 8, pp. 329–383. Amsterdam: Elsevier/North-Holland.
Embrechts, P., A. J. McNeil, and D. Straumann (2002). Correlation and dependence in risk manage-
ment: Properties and pitfalls. In M. Dempster (Ed.), Risk Management: Value at Risk and Beyond,
Chapter 7, pp. 176–223. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gordy, M. B. (2003). A risk-factor model foundation for ratings-based bank capital rules. Journal of
Financial Intermediation 12 (3), 199–232.
Grimmett, G. R. and D. R. Stirzaker (2001). Probability and Random Processes (3rd ed.). New York:
Oxford University Press.
Gut, A. (2005). Probability: A Graduate Course. New York: Springer.
Li, D. X. (2000). On default correlation: A copula function approach. Journal of Fixed Income 9 (4),
43–54.
Lopez, J. A. (2002, June). The empirical relationship between average asset correlation, firm prob-
ability of default and asset size. Working Paper 2002–05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/wp02-05bk.pdf.
MacKenzie, D. and T. Spears (2012, June). The formula that killed Wall Street: The Gauss-
ian copula and the material cultures of modelling. Working paper, University of Edinburgh.
http://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/84243/Gaussian14.pdf.
Merton, R. C. (1974). On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates. Journal of
Finance 29, 449–470.
Nelsen, R. B. (2006). An Introduction to Copulas (2nd ed.). New York: Springer.
Petrov, V. V. (1995). Limit Theorems of Probability Theory: Sequences of Independent Random Vari-
ables. New York: Oxford University Press.
Rutkowski, M. and S. Tarca (2014). Assessing the Basel II internal ratings-based approach: Empirical
evidence from Australia. arXiv: 1412.0064 [q-fin.RM].
Shreve, S. E. (2004). Stochastic Calculus for Finance II: Continuous-Time Models. New York: Springer.
Vasicek, O. (2002, December). Loan portfolio value. RISK Magazine, 160–162.
Wade, W. R. (2004). An Introduction to Analysis (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice
Hall.
